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Abstract This paper advances the hypothesis that in societies that suffer from eth-
nolinguistic center-periphery tension it is harder to agree on public goods than on
transfers. After micro-founding a new peripheral diversity index, it puts forth a sim-
ple theory in which the cost of public goods increases with peripheral ethnolinguistic
diversity and tax compliance decreases with overall ethnolinguistic diversity. It then
empirically explores the relation between public goods provision, transfers, peripheral
diversity and overall diversity. Consistent with the theory, we find that higher levels
of peripheral diversity are associated with less provision of public goods, but more
transfers, whereas higher levels of overall diversity have a negative association with
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transfers. Public goods and transfers are therefore substitutes in their reaction to a
change in peripheral diversity.
1 Introduction
Empirical evidence has shown that countries that are ethnolinguistically more diverse
exhibit lower levels of transfers; those same countries also tend to display a worse
provision of public goods.1 As argued by La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al.
(2003), one reason may be that in more diverse societies people are less willing to pay
taxes to finance transfers and public goods. It is therefore not surprising that when
analyzing the effects of ethnolinguistic diversity, public goods and transfers are often
put in the same bag: both suffer from lower solidarity in more diverse societies.
Although public goods and transfers have much in common, in this paper we
advance the hypothesis that politically deciding on public goods is much harder than
on transfers. To illustrate this in the case of public goods, there may be disagreement
over the particular shape of the country’s road network, and it may be difficult to
decide on where to locate the nation’s capital. In contrast, in the case of transfers,
there is much less discussion over their shape or their type, because, after all, “money
is money”.
How does the difficulty to decide on public goods relate to a country’s diversity?
Casual observation suggests that the political conflict over public goods often arises
from the antagonism between the minorities (the “periphery”) and the dominant group
(the “center”), rather than from tension between all groups. For instance, the attempt
at making Hindi into India’s sole national language in 1965 gave rise to widespread
protests against “Hindi imperialism”. This was a conflict between the periphery and
the center, not between the peripheral groups themselves. Another example is 19th
century France, where schooling was used as a “a major agent of acculturation”,
eliminating local culture and unifying the country (Weber 1979). This process was
not exempt of tension, with many peripheral regions, especially in the Pyrenees and
Brittany, resisting the center. Something similar occurred in 19th century Italy, where
through compulsory education, the Northern elite was able to impose Italian as the
common language, in spite of not being popular (Alesina and Reich 2015). As a last
example, in present-day Spain one point of contention in the political conflict between
the center and the regions is the country’s star-shaped infrastructure network, with
many of the roads and railroads passing through Madrid.
This discussion suggests that two types of diversity may matter in determining
public goods and transfers. When it comes to people’s willingness to pay taxes, it
depends on a society’s overall diversity, whereas when it comes to the political tension
surrounding decisions on public goods, it depends on a society’s tension between the
center and the periphery. In the theory, we define a society’s overall diversity as the
expected ethnolinguistic distance between any two randomly drawn individuals— this
measure is of course nothing else than Greenberg’s B-index. In addition to a society’s
overall diversity, which derives from tension between any two individuals, we also
1 See, e.g., La Porta et al. (1999), Alesina et al. (2003), Desmet et al. (2009), and Desmet et al. (2012).
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define a society’s peripheral diversity, which stems from the antagonism between the
dominant group and theminorities. Themain difference between bothmeasures is that
peripheral diversity ignores any potential tension between minority groups, whereas
overall diversity treats all groups symmetrically.
We then propose a simple theory of the relation between peripheral diversity, overall
diversity, public goods and transfers. A society ismade up of individuals who belong to
different ethnolinguistic groups. Their preferences are quasi-linear in public consump-
tion and private consumption, such that any change in income is absorbed by private
consumption. Public goods and transfers are financed by a proportional tax. Decisions
about public goods, transfers and taxes are taken by the median voter. We then make
two assumptions. First, consistent with La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003),
the cost of tax enforcement is increasing in society’s overall diversity because of peo-
ple’s reduced willingness to comply. Second, consistent with the hypothesis above,
the cost of public goods is increasing in society’s peripheral diversity.
This simple theory yields four predictions. First, the level of public goods is decreas-
ing in the level of peripheral diversity. This happens because an increase in peripheral
diversitymakes the provision of public goodsmore costly, leading to a drop in their pro-
vision. Second, the tax rate does not depend on society’s peripheral diversity. Together
with the first prediction, this implies that an increase in peripheral diversity leads to
more transfers. This means that public goods and transfers are substitutes in how they
react to a change in peripheral diversity. Third, the tax rate declines in the level of
overall diversity. This implies that higher overall diversity lowers transfers. Fourth,
because preferences are quasi-linear, a higher level of overall diversity does not affect
the provision of public goods, despite its negative effect on tax revenues.
We then test these four predictions using detailed data on language use and linguistic
distances from Ethnologue. These data enable us to compute measures of Greenberg’s
B-index and peripheral diversity for 226 countries. With these indices in hand, we
analyze the relation between peripheral diversity, overall diversity, public goods and
transfers in a large cross-section of countries. Consistent with the first two theoretical
predictions, we find that an increase in peripheral diversity lowers the provision of
public goods, but increases transfers. Consistent with the last two theoretical predic-
tions, an increase in overall diversity has no effect on the provision of public goods,
but lowers the level of transfers. Our most important conclusion is that public goods
and transfers act as substitutes when the tension between the center and the periphery
increases. Once again, the intuition is that the antagonism between the center and
the periphery complicates political decision-making, and this disproportionately hurts
public goods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a peripheral
diversity index and develops a theory of diversity, public goods and transfers. Section 3
tests the theory using cross-country data. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory
We develop a simple theory of a society with both public goods and transfers, financed
by a proportional tax. Collecting taxes is challenging, especially in diverse societies.
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This makes the cost of tax enforcement an increasing function of a country’s ethnolin-
guistic diversity. Additionally, in countries with a high degree of tension between the
center and the periphery, drawn-out political discussions increase the cost of providing
public goods. This theory yields predictions for the relation between peripheral diver-
sity, overall diversity, public goods and transfers. These theoretical predictions will
serve as a basis for our empirical investigation. Before presenting the model, we start
by proposing a framework that micro-founds a peripheral diversity index which cap-
tures the alienation that arises between the dominant center and the peripheral minority
groups. An early version of this index appeared in a working paper by Desmet et al.
(2005).
2.1 A general model of peripheral alienation
Consider a country with total population normalized to 1. There are K + 1 distinct
groups, labeled 0, 1, . . . , K . The groups are defined along one dimension of identity,
such as ethnicity, language, religion or place of origin.2 In the theory we refer to them
generically as ethnolinguistic groups, whereas in the empirics we focus, for reasons
that will become apparent later, on linguistic groups. One group, 0, called “center”
or “dominant group”, has a share s0 of the population, whereas the other K groups,
called “minorities” or “peripheral groups”, have population shares sk . Each citizen
of the country belongs to one and only one group. Hence, the vector (s0, s1, . . . , sK )
belongs to the k +1 -dimensional simplex  and ∑Kk=0 sk = 1. Our model focuses on
the frequently observed cases where the “dominant” group contains at least as many
individuals as any of the minority groups:3
s0 ≥ max
k=1,...,K sk .
Hence, we examine the subset of vectors S ⊂  given by:
S =
{
s = (s0, s1, . . . , sK ) ∈  | s0 ≥ max
k=1,...,K sk
}
.
A crucial element of our model is the introduction of ethnolinguistic distances
between groups. Thus, there is a matrix T that assigns the distance τkl to each pair of
groups k and l. We assume that all values τkl lie between 0 and 1, and that τkl = τlk .
The set of such matrices is denoted by T . In the empirical part of the paper τkl is the
linguistic distance between the language spoken by group k and the language spoken
by group l.4
2 We thus ignore the possible overlap between multiple dimensions of identity.
3 There are of course cases where the dominant group does not correspond to the biggest group. Examples
include the Tutsis during different periods of Rwandan history and the Afrikaners of South Africa before
the end of Apartheid.
4 This is similar to the resemblance function of Greenberg (1956).
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The population shares and ethnolinguistic distances will be enough to determine
the level of peripheral diversity which reflects the tension between the center and the
peripheral groups. We proceed in three steps. First, we define the notion of inter-group
alienation. Second, we use this concept to define peripheral alienation. Third, we
show that under certain axioms peripheral alienation can be interpreted as peripheral
diversity.
We start by defining the notion of inter-group alienation. Formally, we assume there
exists an alienation function such that the value of inter-group alienation experienced
by group k towards group l is given by
fkl(sk, sl , τkl),
which depends on the size of both groups and the ethnolinguistic distance between
them. Because of our focus on alienation between the center and the periphery, it is
natural to allow for different functional forms, one for alienation towards the center
and another for alienation towards the periphery. In particular, function f pc(s0, sk, τ0k)
gives the centrifugal alienation experienced by each of the k = 1, . . . , K minority
groups towards the center, whereas the function fcp(s0, sk, τ0k) gives the centripetal
alienation experienced by the center towards each of the k = 1, . . . , K minority
groups. At this point, the functions f pc and fcp have been constructed from the notion
that alienation originates directly between groups. In the next subsection we will
discuss how we can derive the functions f pc and fcp from an alienation function at
the individual level.
The country’s total level of peripheral alienation is then the sum of the alienation
from the minority groups towards the center and from the center towards the minority
groups. Formally, for every vector s = (s0, . . . , sK ) ∈ S, distance matrix T ∈ T and
alienation functions fcp and f pc, we define the total level of peripheral alienation
PA(s, T ) as
PA(s, T ) =
K∑
k=1
(
fcp(s0, sk, τ0k) + f pc(s0, sk, τ0k)
)
. (1)
The following conditions introduce somemore structure, and will allow us to interpret
PA(s, T ) as a measure of peripheral diversity.
Condition 1 (Continuity) The functions fcp and f pc are continuous on S.
Condition 2 (Alienation is increasing in distance) For every k and every s ∈ S, the
functions fcp(s0, sk, ·) and f pc(s0, sk, ·) are strictly increasing on the interval [0, 1].
Condition 3 (Concavity) (i) For every s0 ≥ 1K+1 and τ ∈ [0, 1], the function
fcp(s0, ·, τ ) is concave on the interval [0,min[s0, 1 − s0]]; (ii) For every sk ≤ 12 and
τ ∈ [0, 1], the function f pc(·, sk, τ ) is concave on the interval [max[sk, 1k+1 ], 1− sk].
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Condition 4 (Supermodularity) For every s ∈ S with sk < sl , and τ 1kl < τ 2kl , the
following holds:
fcp(s0, sl , τ
1
kl) − fcp(s0, sk, τ 1kl) < fcp(s0, sl , τ 2kl) − fcp(s0, sk, τ 2kl);
and
f pc(s0, sl , τ
1
kl) − f pc(s0, sk, τ 1kl) < f pc(s0, sl , τ 2kl) − f pc(s0, sk, τ 2kl).
Conditions 1 and 2 impose continuity and monotonicity. Condition 3 is the key to
obtain an index of diversity. If f is concave in the size of the group, smaller groups
experience, in “per capita” terms, more alienation than larger groups.5 In the case
the alienation functions are differentiable, the supermodularity condition implies, in
particular, that ∂ fcp(s0,s, τ )
∂s∂τ > 0.
The following proposition states that peripheral alienation increases when the
minority groups that are more distant from the center are larger:
Proposition 1 Assume that Conditions 1–4 hold. Let the matrix T and the vector
s ∈ S be given. Consider the subset Skl(s) of population shares in S such that s0 = s0.
Let two minority groups k, l be such that τ0k ≥ τ0l . Suppose that the maximization
problem
max
s∈Skl (s)
PA(s, T )
has a unique solution denoted by s∗ ∈ Skl(s). Then s∗k ≥ s∗l .
Proof See Appendix A. unionsq
Proposition 1 says that, if τ0k ≥ τ0l , i.e., if group k is more distant from the
center than group l, maximum peripheral alienation should satisfy s∗k ≥ s∗l . Note
that when τ0k = τ0l the proposition implies that s∗k = s∗l . In this case, the problem
resembles the traditional approach to diversity where only the sizes of the groups
matter. In that context it is commonly assumed that an index of diversity should
satisfy a property similar to the one stated in Proposition 1, namely that diversity is
maximized when there is an equal number of individuals in each group. For example,
Shannon’s information entropy index satisfies this property (Shannon 1949). Thus, our
index PA(s, T ) can be interpreted as an index of peripheral diversity.6 The proposition
clarifies the relationship between diversity and the nature of the inter-group alienation
function. Thus, whenever the functions f pc and fcp are concave in the size of the
5 Assuming convexity, instead of concavity, would give us an index of polarization. We later return to this
issue.
6 Notice that Condition 3 requires concavity of the function fcp(s0, ·, τ ). Thus, this concavity, together
with the other conditions, is sufficient to obtain that the solution to the maximization problem stated in the
proposition is given by s∗k ≥ s∗l . However, concavity of fcp(s0, ·, τ ) is not a necessary condition to obtain
the solution. For example, if the function f pc(·, sk , τ ) is “sufficiently” concave, the function fcp(s0, ·, τ )
need not be concave.
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group, the index PA can be seen as satisfying a necessary condition to be interpreted
as a peripheral diversity index.
At this point, one might ask what would happen if instead of Condition 3, we
imposed the “opposite” condition by assuming the functions fcp and f pc to be convex.
This would imply that if groups k and l have the same ethnolinguistic distance to the
center, the total peripheral alienation increases if members of a smaller group join the
larger one. This alternative property could be seen as a necessary condition to obtain
an index of peripheral polarization instead of an index of peripheral diversity. Thus,
depending on whether inter-group alienation increases in the size of the group in a
concaveway or in a convexway, the aggregate indexPA can be interpreted as satisfying
a necessary property of either a measure of diversity or a measure of polarization. We
summarize this insight in the following corollary of Proposition 1:
Corollary 1 Assume Conditions 1, 2 and 4 hold. Then, if Condition 3 also holds, the
index of peripheral alienation, PA(s, T ), can be interpreted as an index of peripheral
diversity, PD(s, T ), so
PD(s, T ) = PA(s, T ).
If, however, the “opposite” to Condition 3 holds, i.e. if the functions fcp and f pc are
convex, the index of peripheral alienation can be interpreted as an index of peripheral
polarization.
2.2 A specific index of peripheral alienation
In this section we provide a specific form for the inter-group alienation functions f pc
and fcp. These functions will be the ones used in the empirical part. In contrast to our
approach in the previous section, we derive them from assumptions at the individual
level.
To come up with these functions, we follow the identification-alienation framework
of Esteban and Ray (1994), though we will allow for a more flexible approach.7 An
individual of ethnolinguistic group k feels identified with other individuals of the
same group. This sense of identification is a function of the size of the group, and is
represented by sαk . In Esteban and Ray (1994) α is positive, implying that the sense of
identification is stronger the bigger the group. In contrast, we prefer not to restrict the
value of α. Indeed, it may very well be that the sense of identification becomes smaller
as the group becomes larger, in which case α < 0. There are many examples where
small ethnic, linguistic, cultural or religious groups feel a keener sense of community
and a stronger desire to assert their identity.
An agent of ethnolinguistic group k feels more alienated from someone of ethnolin-
guistic group l the greater the distance τkl . This alienation is influenced by the sense of
identification. In particular, an individual attaches more weight to the distance τkl if his
7 For a similar approach used to derive a variety of indices—Greenberg’s A index, Greenberg’s B index,
Esteban and Ray’s (1994) polarization index, Reynal-Querol’s (2002) polarization index and a simple
version of the peripheral index—see Desmet et al. (2009).
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sense of identification with his own group is stronger. As defined in Esteban and Ray
(1994), the alienation experienced by an individual of group k towards an individual
of group l is sαk τkl . Since there is a proportion s0 of individuals belonging to the dom-
inant group, the centrifugal alienation of an agent of minority group k is sβ0 s
α
k τ0k . In
Esteban and Ray (1994), β = 1. In our case, we suppose that an individual’s centrifu-
gal alienation only depends on there being a dominant group, independently of how
many people actually belong to that dominant language, so that we set β = 0. In that
case, an individual’s centrifugal alienation is sαk τ0k . Setting β = 0 captures the idea
that some policy choices may be imposed by the center because of it being the center
and not because of its exact size. If so, it is reasonable to think that the centrifugal
alienation associated with these policies are independent of the center’s exact size. If
each individual of minority group k feels an alienation sαk τ0k towards the center, and
if a share sk of the population belongs to group k, then the centrifugal alienation of
all individuals of group k is s1+αk τ0k . Thus, the inter-group alienation function f pc is
given by
f pc(s0, sk, τ0k) ≡ s1+αk τ0k . (2)
We assume that individuals of the center have the same type of alienation function
as individuals of the minority groups, except for the fact that in this case β is set to 1.
There is no reason why the alienation experienced by the center towards the periphery
should be independent of the peripheral groups’ sizes. Hence, the centripetal alienation
felt by members of the central group depends on the size of the minorities, so that
fcp(s0, sk, τ0k) ≡ sks1+α0 τ0k . (3)
We can now define the total level of peripheral alienation by plugging (2) and (3)
into (1):
PA(s, T ) =
K∑
k=1
( f pc(s0, sk, τ0k) + fcp(s0, sk, τ0k)) (4)
=
K∑
k=1
(s1+αk τ0k + sks1+α0 τ0k)
This is the index we will be using in the empirical section of the paper. Depending on
the value of α, (4) can be interpreted as an index of peripheral diversity or an index
of peripheral polarization. We summarize this result in the following corollary:
Corollary 2 If α < 0, the index (4) satisfies Conditions 1–4, and can thus be viewed
as an index of peripheral diversity. Hence,
PD(s, T ) = PA(s, T ) =
K∑
k=1
(s1+αk τ0k + sks1+α0 τ0k) if α < 0.
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If, in contrast, α > 0, the index (4) can be interpreted as an index of peripheral
polarization.
To illustrate the difference between diversity and polarization, consider a country
with three groups. Their respective sizes are s0, s1 and s2. Group 0 is the dominant
one, and groups 1 and 2 are minorities. Further assume that the distance between
each minority group and the dominant group is 1. Index (4) is then equal to s1s
1+α
0 +
s2s
1+α
0 + s1+α1 + s1+α2 . We can now interpret this example for the two cases we have
in mind. If α < 0, we get a measure reflecting diversity. For a given share of the
dominant group, the maximum diversity is reached when s1 = s2. In other words, we
face most diversity with two (equally sized) minority groups. If α > 0, we obtain a
measure reflecting polarization that attains the highest level if one of the two remaining
groups disappears. In other words, the level of polarization is highest if we have only
one, rather than two, minority groups. This insight does not change once we allow for
different distances between groups.
2.3 Peripheral diversity, public goods and transfers
Denote the income of individual i by yi . Average income is y, and median income is
ym , where ym < y. The government provides everyone with the same level of public
goods and lump-sum transfers. All individuals have the same preferences over public
consumption (G) and private consumption (c), represented by the quasi-linear utility
function
u(G, c) = 2G1/2 + c.
The government pays for public goods and transfers through a proportional tax.
The cost of public goods is increasing in the political conflict incurred to reach an
agreement. Our discussion in the introduction suggests that this political conflict often
has a markedly center-periphery character. For example, the center and the periphery
may have long drawn-out discussions about which language to use in schools and
hospitals, or it may take many fights for both sides to agree on the shape of the
country’s road network. We therefore postulate that the cost of the public goods is
proportional to the tension individuals from the periphery feel towards the center,
∑K
k=1 s1+ατ0k , and the tension individuals from the center feel towards the periphery,
∑K
k=1 sks
1+α
0 τ0k . That is, the cost of the public good, p, is an increasing function of
the peripheral index, PD; for simplicity, we assume that p = (PD + η), with η > 0.8
Collecting taxes is challenging in diverse societies. We assume that the cost of tax
enforcement is an increasing function of the average ethnolinguistic distance between
individuals in society,
∑
k
∑
l sl skτlk . This captures the idea in La Porta et al. (1999)
and Alesina et al. (2003) that people are less tax compliant in more diverse societies.
In addition, the cost of tax enforcement is assumed to be increasing in the tax rate, t .
8 As we will later argue, the price of the public good needs to be high enough. Since PD can be zero, this
requires η > 0.
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Hence, a tax rate t will generate government income t y(1−γ t ∑k
∑
l sl skτlk), where
γ > 0 and γ
∑
k
∑
l sl skτlk < 1. Notice that
∑
k
∑
l sl skτlk is nothing else than
Greenberg’s B-index, which measures the average ethnolinguistic distance between
two randomly picked individuals. Hence, B = ∑k
∑
l sl skτlk . In our model Green-
berg’s B-index is meant to capture the tension between all groups, as opposed to
peripheral diversity, which measures the center-periphery tension.9 The society’s bud-
get constraint can then be written as
(PD + η)G + r = t y(1 − γ t B).
The society has to choose the level of public good, G, the income tax rate, t , and the
transfer that each individual receives, r . We adopt the view that society implements
a Condorcet winner policy. We will now show that the optimal policy for the median
income agent is a Condorcet winner. His optimal policy (G∗, t∗, r∗) is the one given
by the solution to the following optimization problem
max
G,t,r
2G1/2 + (1 − t)ym + r
s.t. (PD + η)G + r = t y(1 − γ t B)
0 ≤ t ≤ 1
r ≥ 0.
The first order conditions for an interior solution of this problem yield
G∗ =
(
1
PD + η
)2
(5)
t∗ = y − ym
2γ By
(6)
r∗ = −(PD + η)G + t y(1 − tγ B). (7)
Note that condition t ≤ 1 implies that an interior solution satisfies10
y − ym
y
≤ 2γ B
and that the level of public good G∗ does not depend on the tax rate t . Furthermore,
Eqs. (5) and (7) imply that11
r = t y(1 − tγ B) − 1
PD + η . (8)
9 Greenberg’s B-index can be derived from the same identification-alienation framework. See Desmet
et al. (2009).
10 Our results can be also extended to the case of a corner solution in which the tax rate is t = 1.
11 Since we assume that transfers are positive, the price of the public good PD + η has to be high enough
to ensure r > 0.
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Because of the budget constraint (PD + η)G + r = t y(1 − γ t B), when comparing
two different policies we only need to focus on the level of the public good G and the
tax rate t . Consider a policy (G ′, t ′) that is not optimal for the median income agent.
In that case,
2G∗1/2 + (1 − t∗)ym + t∗y(1 − t∗γ B) − (PD + η)G∗ > 2G ′1/2
+ (1 − t ′)ym + t ′y(1 − t ′γ B) − (PD + η)G ′
which can be rewritten as
(t ′ − t∗)ym > 2G ′1/2 + t ′y(1 − t ′γ B) − (PD + η)G ′ − 2G∗1/2
− t∗y(1 − t∗γ B) + (PD + η)G∗ (9)
If t ′ < t∗, it follows that an inequality equivalent to (9) also holds for all yi ≤ ym ,
so that at least 50% of the individuals prefers (G∗, t∗) to (G ′, t ′). If t ′ > t∗, it follows
that an inequality equivalent to (9) holds for all yi ≥ ym , so that again at least 50%
of the individuals prefers (G∗, t∗) to (G ′, t ′). Note furthermore that if the tax rate t∗
is implemented, all agents agree on the optimal level of public good, G∗. Thus, the
optimal policy of the median income agent, (G∗, t∗), is a Condorcet winner policy.
We now analyze how the level of public goods and transfers depend on peripheral
diversity and overall diversity. From (5) it is obvious that
dG∗
dPD
< 0 and
dG∗
d B
= 0. (10)
Combining (6) and (8), we can write
r∗ = − 1
PD + η +
(
y − ym
4γ B
) (
1 + ym
y
)
. (11)
Given that ym < y, from (11) it follows that
dr∗
dPD
> 0 and
dr∗
d B
< 0. (12)
Before turning to the empirics, it is useful to provide some intuition for our findings
in (10) and (12). When peripheral diversity increases, the cost of public goods goes
up, but the cost of enforcing taxes does not change. As a result, the drop in public
goods provision, due to its higher price, is compensated by an increase in transfers.
When, instead, overall diversity goes up, collecting taxes becomes more expensive.
The quasi-linear nature of the preference function then implies that the provision of
public goods does not change, so that the lower tax revenues must entail a lower level
of transfers.
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3 Empirical analysis
In our empirical analysis we explore the relation between peripheral diversity, overall
diversity, public goods provision and redistribution through transfers. In particular,
we test whether greater peripheral diversity is associated with worse public goods
provision, but higher levels of transfers.We also test whether higher overall diversity is
associatedwith lower transfers.Before doing so,wediscuss howwedefinegroups, how
we measure distances between them, and which parameter values to use to measure
peripheral diversity (4).
3.1 Groups, distances and parameter values
Groups are definedby the language theyuse. Though the theory appliesmore broadly to
any dimension of identity, we focus on language because of the availability of detailed
data on both language use and linguistic distances. In fact, even studies that focus
on ethnicity, such as Fearon (2003), often use language to define distances between
ethnicities.12
Linguists use a tree structure to represent the distance between languages. This
tree captures the genealogy of languages, classifying them by their family structure.
For example, if Hindi and Russian got separated nearly 7000 years ago, whereas
Russian and Byelorussian split apart less than 1000 years, then Hindi and Russian are
more distant cousins—and hence will have less branches in common in the language
tree—than Russian and Byelorussian (Gray andAtkinson 2003). The proximity of two
languages can then be measured by the number of shared branches in the language
tree.
In our theory we are interested in a distance measure τlk between languages l and k
that is related to the alienation an individual from group l feels towards an individual
from group k. A priori there is no reason why τlk should be a linear function of the
number of shared branches in the language tree. For example, if alienation stems
from the inability to understand each other, then even relatively small distances in the
language tree may be enough to hinder communication. If, instead, alienation is rooted
in deep cleavages going back thousands of years, then the number of shared branches
must be very low for tension to arise. We therefore follow Fearon (2003) and Desmet
et al. (2009) and measure τlk as a nonlinear negative function of blk , the number of
branches shared by languages l and k. Hence,
τlk = 1 −
(
blk
m
)δ
, (13)
where m is the maximum number of branches between any two languages and δ is a
parameter that determines how fast the distance τlk declines as the number of shared
branches increases. Lower values of δ imply a more convex function, meaning that
linguistic distances only become important when two languages are sufficiently apart
12 In many countries, especially in Africa and Asia, language coincides with ethnicity.
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in the language tree. Going back to our previous example, if alienation stems from
the inability to understand each other, then τlk becomes important as soon as two
languages are no longer close cousins in the language tree. In that case, a high value
of δ would be appropriate. In our benchmark analysis we follow Fearon (2003) and
use a value of δ = 0.5, but explore other values in our robustness checks. As for the
value of α, our focus is on peripheral diversity, rather than peripheral polarization. We
therefore choose a value of α = −0.5. To measure the number of shared branches
between any two languages, we use the language tree from the Ethnologue project
(Gordon 2005).
3.2 Peripheral diversity and Greenberg’s B-index
In this section we provide estimates of peripheral diversity and Greenberg’s B-index
for a broad cross-section of countries. Recall from our theory that peripheral diversity
captures the antagonismbetween the dominant group and theminority groups,whereas
Greenberg’s B-index captures the antagonism between all groups. In both cases, this
antagonism is increasing in the linguistic distances between the groups. Using data
from Ethnologue (Gordon 2005), Table 10 in Appendix B shows the values of periph-
eral diversity (α = −0.5 and δ = 0.5) and Greenberg’s B-Index (δ = 0.5) for 226
countries. The linear correlation between the two indices is 0.73, whereas the rank
correlation is 0.92. Though high, there are notable differences between both indices.
Some countries have a relatively high degree of peripheral diversity, but a relatively
low degree of overall diversity. For example, Mexico ranks 22 in terms of peripheral
diversity, but only 153 in terms of Greenberg’s B-index. Likewise, Russia ranks 38 in
terms of peripheral diversity, but 117 in terms of Greenberg’s B-index. Some countries
exhibit the opposite pattern, with relatively low degrees of peripheral diversity, in spite
of having relatively high levels of Greenberg’s B-index. Examples include Belize and
Bolivia.
3.3 Public goods, peripheral diversity and Greenberg’s B-index
Table 1 reports our benchmark regression of public goods on Greenberg’s B-index and
peripheral diversity. To give a broad overview of different public goods, we include
two related to health (child mortality and measles immunization), two related to edu-
cation (illiteracy and school attainment) and two related to infrastructure (access to
improved sanitation and road density). In addition to our variables of interest, we
also control for GDP per capita, regional dummies, absolute latitude and roughness
of terrain. In general the data cover the period 1990–2010. Appendix B provides a
detailed description of the data sources and their time spans. As expected, Table 1
shows that, whenever statistically significant, income per capita and distance from
the equator (absolute latitude) improve public goods outcomes, whereas roughness of
terrain worsens them. As for regional differences, sub-Saharan Africa fares worst.
Turning to our two variables of interest, we find that peripheral diversity tends
to be associated with worse outcomes. In all but two of the cases, the coefficients
are statistically significant at the 5% level. In one of the remaining cases—school
13
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attainment—the coefficient is still statistically significant at the 10% level, whereas
in the other case—road density—the coefficient is statistically insignificant. As for
Greenberg’s B-index, its coefficients are statistically insignificant in all cases. These
results are in line with our theory: as shown by (10) and (12), a higher degree of
peripheral diversity worsens the provision of public goods, whereas a greater level of
overall diversity has no effect.
In terms of their economic magnitudes, the estimated coefficients on peripheral
diversity are by no means trivial. The standardized β values on peripheral diversity
range from 7% in the case of child mortality to −31% in the case of measles immu-
nization. This means that a one standard deviation increase in peripheral diversity is
associated with an increase in child mortality by 7% of its standard deviation, and it
is associated with a decrease in the measles immunization rate by 31% of its standard
deviation. To put these numbers into perspective, in the case of child mortality, a one
standard deviation increase in peripheral diversity has about one-tenth of the effect of
a one standard deviation decrease in GDP per capita, whereas in the case of measles
immunization, a one standard deviation increase in peripheral diversity has a larger
effect than a one standard deviation decrease in GDP per capita.
We conduct four types of robustness checks. In a first exercise we examine whether
our results change when controlling for legal origin and religious composition. As
can be seen in Table 2, our findings are unchanged. The standardized β values on
peripheral diversity are slightly smaller: 6% in the case of child mortality and −26%
in the case of measles immunization. Socialist legal origin tends to improve public
goods, whereas a higher share of Muslims worsens some of the outcomes, such as
child mortality and school attainment.
In a second exercise, we explore whether the results depend on the inclusion of
particular countries or regions. Using our benchmark specification of Table 1, we
exclude, one at a time, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and
East and Southeast Asia. Table 3, Panels A through C, shows that when excluding East
and Southeast Asia, the association between peripheral diversity and public goods
provision becomes weaker, though it continues to be statistically significant at the
5% level for measles immunization and access to improved sanitation. In the case
of measles immunization, the standardized β ranges from −27% when excluding
sub-Saharan Africa to −36% when excluding East and Southeast Asia, whereas for
access to improved sanitation, the standardized β ranges from −16% when excluding
East and Southeast Asia to −29% when excluding sub-Saharan Africa. To further
assess the importance of particular observations, we eliminate outliers using the dfbeta
method.13 Table 4 shows the results for the benchmark specification (Panel A) and
for the more comprehensive specification (Panel B). In the benchmark specification
peripheral diversity continues to be statistically significant at the 5% level with the
right sign in three out of the six specifications, whereas in the more comprehensive
specification this is true in four out of the six specifications. In the latter case, peripheral
diversity only loses significance for school attainment. Once again, the magnitudes of
13 The dfbeta measures for each variable how influential each observation is. Following Belsley et al.
(1980), we drop observations with an absolute value of dfbeta on either Greenberg’s B-index or peripheral
diversity greater than 2/
√
(#obs).
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the effects do not change much. For example, in the case of measles immunization the
standardized β is between −26% (Panel B) and −32% (Panel A).
In a third exercise, we include Greenberg’s B-index and peripheral diversity one at a
time, rather than jointly. Table 5 reports the results. When only including Greenberg’s
B-index (Panel A), it is associated with worse public goods outcomes. Two out of the
six outcomes yield coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1% level, two
other outcomes give coefficients that are statistically significant at the 10% level, and
the remaining two are not significant. When only including peripheral diversity (Panel
B), it also tends to be associated with worse public goods outcomes. Four out of the six
outcomes give coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1% level, one other at
the 10% level, and the remaining one is not significant. It is not surprising that when
includingGreenberg’sB-index andPDseparately, both tend to be negatively associated
with public goods. After all, Greenberg’s B-index and PD are positively correlated.
Note, furthermore, that the R2 values tend to be slightly higher for the regressions
that include PD than for those that include Greenberg’s B-index. Consistent with this,
when both are jointly included, as in Table 1, PD trumps Greenberg’s B-index.
In a fourth exercise, we examine the importance of linguistic distances for our
results. Recall that lower values of δ imply a linguistic distance function that is highly
convex, meaning that the linguistic distance between two languages only becomes
important when they are very far apart in the language tree. In contrast, higher values of
δ imply that the linguistic distance between two languages already becomes important
when they are still quite close in the language tree. Table 6 reports results for δ = 0.1
(Panel A) and δ = 0.9 (Panel B). The results do not seem to depend much on the
value of δ: the lower value of δ yields coefficients on PD that are statistically slightly
more significant than the higher value of δ, but the difference is small. In terms of their
economic significance, we confirm our previous results. For δ = 0.1, the standardized
β for child mortality is 7% and for measles immunization is−29%; the corresponding
figures for δ = 0.9 are 6 and −31%. These numbers are virtually identical to those
we found in our benchmark analysis of Table 1.
3.4 Transfers, peripheral diversity and Greenberg’s B-index
We now turn to analyzing the relation between peripheral diversity, Greenberg’s B-
index and transfers. Our dependent variable is transfers and subsidies as a share of
GDP. As in the case of public goods, the data cover the period 1990–2010. In addition
to peripheral diversity and Greenberg’s B-index, we also control for other possible
determinants of the level of transfers. Table 7 reports our findings for different sets
of covariates. In column (1), where we control for GDP per capita, absolute latitude,
roughness of terrain and regional dummies, we find that transfers tend to go down
when Greenberg’s B-index increases. In contrast, transfers tend to increase when
peripheral diversity is higher. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%
level. These findings are consistent with our theoretical results (10) and (12). The rest
of the columns of Table 7 analyze the robustness of our findings by including different
controls, such as population size, legal origin, religious composition, and share of the
population 65 years and older. Our results are unchanged.
21
Ta
bl
e
7
T
ra
ns
fe
rs
,G
re
en
be
rg
’s
B
-i
nd
ex
an
d
pe
ri
ph
er
al
di
ve
rs
ity
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
:
tr
an
sf
er
s
19
90
–2
01
0
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
G
re
en
be
rg
’s
B
-i
nd
ex
−9
.7
69
**
*
[−
4.
36
]
−8
.7
42
**
*
[−
3.
70
]
−8
.6
57
**
*
[−
3.
65
]
−5
.8
10
**
*
[−
2.
75
]
−5
.6
96
**
[−
2.
55
]
−4
.8
80
**
[−
2.
29
]
Pe
ri
ph
er
al
di
ve
rs
ity
0.
62
5*
**
[3
.8
7]
0.
51
0*
**
[2
.8
5]
0.
59
1*
**
[2
.9
4]
0.
46
1*
*
[2
.0
8]
0.
49
9*
[1
.9
3]
0.
55
4*
*
[2
.1
5]
L
og
G
D
P
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
(1
99
0–
20
10
)
1.
64
5*
**
[5
.3
0]
1.
81
7*
**
[5
.8
1]
2.
47
3*
**
[6
.8
5]
1.
12
0*
**
[4
.4
8]
1.
50
3*
**
[5
.0
7]
1.
27
9*
**
[4
.8
1]
A
bs
ol
ut
e
la
tit
ud
e
0.
22
9*
**
[5
.8
9]
0.
22
7*
**
[5
.9
8]
0.
15
2*
**
[3
.0
5]
0.
07
4*
[1
.7
8]
0.
04
3
[0
.9
2]
0.
07
2
[1
.5
3]
Te
rr
ai
n
ro
ug
hn
es
s
−1
.3
73
[−
0.
52
]
−0
.7
73
[−
0.
31
]
−0
.7
30
[−
0.
28
]
−4
.8
50
**
[−
2.
26
]
−4
.6
43
**
[−
2.
13
]
−6
.7
18
**
*
[−
3.
33
]
L
at
in
A
m
er
ic
a
an
d
C
ar
ib
be
an
−2
.0
15
*
[−
1.
70
]
−1
.7
61
[−
1.
50
]
−1
.7
86
[−
1.
43
]
−3
.1
68
**
*
[−
3.
32
]
−3
.2
75
**
*
[−
3.
56
]
−5
.0
69
**
*
[−
4.
91
]
Su
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n
A
fr
ic
a
0.
38
4
[0
.2
9]
0.
77
4
[0
.6
1]
1.
52
0
[1
.2
4]
−0
.0
87
[−
0.
10
]
0.
26
7
[0
.3
1]
−0
.3
96
[−
0.
40
]
E
as
ta
nd
So
ut
he
as
tA
si
a
−2
.1
18
[−
1.
57
]
−2
.6
46
*
[−
1.
82
]
−3
.8
38
**
[−
2.
28
]
−4
.2
09
**
*
[−
3.
64
]
−4
.6
53
**
*
[−
3.
43
]
−4
.6
85
**
*
[−
3.
78
]
L
og
po
pu
la
tio
n
(1
99
0–
20
10
)
0.
47
6*
[1
.7
1]
0.
63
3*
*
[2
.3
7]
0.
25
7
[1
.1
1]
0.
33
0
[1
.5
0]
0.
17
9
[0
.9
3]
L
og
po
pu
la
tio
n
>
65
ye
ar
s
(1
99
0–
20
10
)
6.
06
7*
**
[8
.2
2]
5.
72
0*
**
[8
.3
1]
4.
77
2*
**
[7
.2
2]
So
ci
al
is
tl
eg
al
or
ig
in
3.
39
9
[1
.0
9]
1.
63
3
[0
.6
4]
−3
.6
61
[−
1.
24
]
Fr
en
ch
le
ga
lo
ri
gi
n
−0
.2
98
[−
0.
09
]
0.
07
5
[0
.0
3]
−5
.6
35
*
[−
1.
73
]
G
er
m
an
le
ga
lo
ri
gi
n
0.
62
5
[0
.1
5]
0.
37
7
[0
.1
1]
−4
.1
17
[−
1.
32
]
B
ri
tis
h
le
ga
lo
ri
gi
n
−1
.4
93
[−
0.
49
]
−1
.2
75
[−
0.
50
]
−5
.6
68
*
[−
1.
93
]
Sh
ar
e
of
pr
ot
es
ta
nt
s
−0
.0
58
**
[−
2.
59
]
Sh
ar
e
of
R
om
an
C
at
ho
lic
s
0.
03
5*
**
[2
.9
7]
Sh
ar
e
of
m
us
lim
s
−0
.0
19
*
[−
1.
71
]
C
on
st
an
t
−8
.2
61
**
*
[−
2.
82
]
−1
7.
60
1*
**
[−
3.
10
]
−2
3.
71
5*
**
[−
3.
14
]
−1
4.
56
2*
**
[−
3.
15
]
−1
7.
52
0*
**
[−
3.
04
]
−6
.8
57
[−
1.
17
]
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
13
1
13
1
13
1
13
1
13
1
13
0
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
73
18
0.
73
96
0.
76
54
0.
83
00
0.
84
03
0.
87
32
R
ob
us
tt
-s
ta
tis
tic
s
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.*
**
p
<
0.
01
,*
*
p
<
0.
05
,*
p
<
0.
1
22
Ta
bl
e
8
T
ra
ns
fe
rs
an
d
di
ve
rs
ity
:d
if
fe
re
nt
re
gi
on
s
an
d
in
flu
en
tia
lo
bs
er
va
tio
ns
T
ra
ns
fe
rs
19
90
–2
01
0
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
N
o
su
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n
N
o
L
at
in
A
m
er
ic
a
or
N
o
E
as
ta
nd
So
ut
he
as
t
N
o
su
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n
N
o
L
at
in
A
m
er
ic
a
or
N
o
E
as
ta
nd
So
ut
he
as
t
A
fr
ic
a
C
ar
ib
be
an
A
si
a
A
fr
ic
a
C
ar
ib
be
an
A
si
a
Pa
ne
lA
:
D
iff
er
en
tr
eg
io
ns
a
G
re
en
be
rg
−9
.9
12
**
*
[−
3.
73
]
−1
1.
04
6*
**
[−
4.
17
]
−1
0.
44
4*
**
[−
3.
73
]
−4
.4
27
*
[−
1.
99
]
−5
.2
65
**
[−
2.
08
]
−1
.1
46
[−
0.
48
]
Pe
ri
ph
er
al
di
ve
rs
ity
0.
64
9*
**
[3
.5
7]
0.
70
9*
**
[3
.8
0]
0.
64
3*
*
[2
.0
6]
0.
96
6*
**
[5
.0
5]
0.
60
5*
*
[2
.4
4]
−0
.3
39
[−
1.
17
]
L
og
po
pu
la
tio
n
>
65
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
L
eg
al
or
ig
in
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
el
ig
io
us
co
m
po
si
tio
n
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
10
0
10
7
12
1
99
10
6
12
0
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
68
41
0.
74
14
0.
72
85
0.
88
30
0.
87
72
0.
88
43
23
Ta
bl
e
8
co
nt
in
ue
d
T
ra
ns
fe
rs
19
90
–2
01
0
(1
)
(2
)
D
ro
p
in
flu
en
tia
lo
bs
er
va
tio
ns
D
ro
p
in
flu
en
tia
lo
bs
er
va
tio
ns
Pa
ne
lB
:
E
xc
lu
di
ng
in
flu
en
ti
al
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
b
G
re
en
be
rg
−1
0.
19
9*
**
[−
4.
63
]
−3
.7
27
*
[−
1.
98
]
Pe
ri
ph
er
al
di
ve
rs
ity
0.
75
4*
**
[2
.7
2]
0.
15
7
[0
.6
2]
L
og
po
pu
la
tio
n
>
65
N
o
Y
es
L
eg
al
or
ig
in
N
o
Y
es
R
el
ig
io
us
co
m
po
si
tio
n
N
o
Y
es
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
12
2
11
7
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
79
37
0.
91
56
R
ob
us
tt
-s
ta
tis
tic
s
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.*
**
p
<
0.
01
,*
*
p
<
0.
05
,*
p
<
0.
1
a
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
in
cl
ud
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
co
nt
ro
ls
:l
og
G
D
P
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
(1
99
0–
20
00
),
ab
so
lu
te
la
tit
ud
e,
te
rr
ai
n
ro
ug
hn
es
s,
su
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n
A
fr
ic
a
du
m
m
y,
E
as
ta
nd
So
ut
he
as
tA
si
a
du
m
m
y,
an
d
lo
g
po
pu
la
tio
n
(1
99
0–
20
10
).
In
ad
di
tio
n,
co
lu
m
ns
(4
),
(5
)
an
d
(6
)
al
so
in
cl
ud
e
lo
g
po
pu
la
tio
n
ab
ov
e
65
ye
ar
s
(1
99
0–
20
10
),
so
ci
al
is
t
le
ga
l
or
ig
in
,F
re
nc
h
le
ga
l
or
ig
in
,
G
er
m
an
le
ga
lo
ri
gi
n,
B
ri
tis
h
le
ga
lo
ri
gi
n,
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
pr
ot
es
ta
nt
,p
er
ce
nt
ag
e
ca
th
ol
ic
an
d
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
m
us
lim
.
b
E
xc
lu
de
so
bs
er
va
tio
ns
w
ith
an
ab
so
lu
te
df
be
ta
va
lu
e
fo
rG
re
en
be
rg
’s
B
-i
nd
ex
or
fo
rp
er
ip
he
ra
ld
iv
er
si
ty
gr
ea
te
rt
ha
n
2
di
vi
de
d
by
th
e
sq
ua
re
ro
ot
of
th
e
nu
m
be
ro
fo
bs
er
va
tio
ns
.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
in
cl
ud
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
co
nt
ro
ls
:l
og
G
D
P
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
(1
99
0–
20
00
),
ab
so
lu
te
la
tit
ud
e,
te
rr
ai
n
ro
ug
hn
es
s,
su
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n
A
fr
ic
a
du
m
m
y,
E
as
ta
nd
So
ut
he
as
tA
si
a
du
m
m
y,
an
d
lo
g
po
pu
la
tio
n
(1
99
0–
20
10
).
In
ad
di
tio
n,
co
lu
m
n
(2
)
al
so
in
cl
ud
es
lo
g
po
pu
la
tio
n
ab
ov
e
65
ye
ar
s
(1
99
0–
20
10
),
so
ci
al
is
tl
eg
al
or
ig
in
,F
re
nc
h
le
ga
lo
ri
gi
n,
G
er
m
an
le
ga
l
or
ig
in
,B
ri
tis
h
le
ga
lo
ri
gi
n,
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
pr
ot
es
ta
nt
,p
er
ce
nt
ag
e
ca
th
ol
ic
an
d
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
m
us
lim
24
Ta
bl
e
9
T
ra
ns
fe
rs
an
d
di
ve
rs
ity
:f
ur
th
er
ro
bu
st
ne
ss
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
:t
ra
ns
fe
rs
19
90
–2
01
0
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
Pa
ne
lA
:
G
re
en
be
rg
’s
B
-i
nd
ex
an
d
pe
ri
ph
er
al
di
ve
rs
it
y
se
pa
ra
te
ly
a
G
re
en
be
rg
−5
.8
15
**
*
[−
3.
38
]
−1
.6
52
[−
1.
19
]
Pe
ri
ph
er
al
di
ve
rs
ity
−0
.1
79
[−
0.
67
]
0.
13
7
[0
.5
8]
L
og
po
pu
la
tio
n
>
65
ye
ar
s
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
L
eg
al
or
ig
in
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
R
el
ig
io
us
co
m
po
si
tio
n
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
13
1
13
0
13
1
13
0
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
73
28
0.
86
69
0.
71
20
0.
86
60
25
Ta
bl
e
9
co
nt
in
ue
d
T
ra
ns
fe
rs
19
90
–2
01
0
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
δ
=
0.
1
δ
=
0.
1
δ
=
0.
9
δ
=
0.
9
Pa
ne
lB
:
D
iff
er
en
tv
al
ue
s
of
δb
G
re
en
be
rg
−9
.7
00
**
*
[−
3.
80
]
−5
.2
98
**
[−
2.
12
]
−7
.7
14
**
*
[−
3.
51
]
−4
.2
50
**
[−
2.
22
]
Pe
ri
ph
er
al
di
ve
rs
ity
0.
56
7*
*
[2
.3
6]
0.
58
5
[1
.6
4]
0.
45
0*
**
[2
.8
0]
0.
48
9*
*
[2
.1
5]
L
og
po
pu
la
tio
n
>
65
ye
ar
s
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
L
eg
al
or
ig
in
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
R
el
ig
io
us
co
m
po
si
tio
n
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
13
1
13
0
13
1
13
0
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
74
12
0.
87
20
0.
73
69
0.
87
27
R
ob
us
tt
-s
ta
tis
tic
s
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.*
**
p
<
0.
01
,*
*
p
<
0.
05
,*
p
<
0.
1
a
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
in
cl
ud
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
co
nt
ro
ls
:l
og
G
D
P
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
(1
99
0–
20
00
),
ab
so
lu
te
la
tit
ud
e,
te
rr
ai
n
ro
ug
hn
es
s,
su
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n
A
fr
ic
a
du
m
m
y,
E
as
ta
nd
So
ut
he
as
tA
si
a
du
m
m
y,
an
d
lo
g
po
pu
la
tio
n
(1
99
0–
20
10
).
In
ad
di
tio
n,
co
lu
m
ns
(2
)a
nd
(4
)a
ls
o
in
cl
ud
e
lo
g
po
pu
la
tio
n
ab
ov
e
65
ye
ar
s
(1
99
0–
20
10
),
so
ci
al
is
tl
eg
al
or
ig
in
,F
re
nc
h
le
ga
lo
ri
gi
n,
G
er
m
an
le
ga
lo
ri
gi
n,
B
ri
tis
h
le
ga
lo
ri
gi
n,
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
pr
ot
es
ta
nt
,p
er
ce
nt
ag
e
ca
th
ol
ic
an
d
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
m
us
lim
b
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
in
cl
ud
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
co
nt
ro
ls
:l
og
G
D
P
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
(1
99
0–
20
00
),
ab
so
lu
te
la
tit
ud
e,
te
rr
ai
n
ro
ug
hn
es
s,
su
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n
A
fr
ic
a
du
m
m
y,
E
as
ta
nd
So
ut
he
as
tA
si
a
du
m
m
y,
an
d
lo
g
po
pu
la
tio
n
(1
99
0–
20
10
).
In
ad
di
tio
n,
co
lu
m
ns
(2
)a
nd
(4
)a
ls
o
in
cl
ud
e
lo
g
po
pu
la
tio
n
ab
ov
e
65
ye
ar
s
(1
99
0–
20
10
),
so
ci
al
is
tl
eg
al
or
ig
in
,F
re
nc
h
le
ga
lo
ri
gi
n,
G
er
m
an
le
ga
lo
ri
gi
n,
B
ri
tis
h
le
ga
lo
ri
gi
n,
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
pr
ot
es
ta
nt
,p
er
ce
nt
ag
e
ca
th
ol
ic
an
d
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
m
us
lim
26
The magnitudes of the effects are economically meaningful. Focusing on column
(1), the standardized β on peripheral diversity is 16%, and the standardized β on
Greenberg’s B-index is −28%. This means that a one standard deviation increase in
peripheral diversity raises transfers by 16% of its standard deviation, whereas a one
standard deviation increase in Greenberg’s B-index lowers transfers by 28% of its
standard deviation. To provide a benchmark for these figures, a one standard increase
in GDP per capita raises transfers by 35% of its standard deviation. Hence, the roles
of peripheral diversity and Greenberg’s B-index are quantitatively relevant.
We conduct three further robustness checks. First, we analyze the importance of
particular regions or observations for our results. Table 8, Panel A, shows the results
when we drop different parts of the world. Focusing on the benchmark specification,
reported in columns (1) through (3), the standardized β onGreenberg’s B-index ranges
from −27% when excluding sub-Saharan Africa to −29% when excluding East and
Southeast Asia, whereas the standardized β on peripheral diversity ranges from 12%
when excluding East and Southeast Asia to 16% when excluding sub-Saharan Africa.
Table 8, Panel B, explores the effect of influential observations based on the same
dfbeta method as before. In the benchmark regression, reported in column (1), the
results hardly change. However, in the more comprehensive specification, reported in
column (2), the results are weaker in that peripheral diversity is no longer statistically
significant.
Second, we include Greenberg’s B-index and peripheral diversity as two separate
regressors. For each case, we rerun the regressions of column (1) and column (6)
of Table 7. As can be observed in Table 9, Panel A, the association between our
two diversity indices and transfers is weaker, and most often statistically insignificant.
This is not surprising: sinceGreenberg’sB-index and peripheral diversity are positively
correlated, but have opposite effects when both included, their effects when introduced
separately are ambiguous. This underscores the importance of jointly controlling for
Greenberg’s B-index and peripheral diversity. Not doing so would amount to omitted
variable bias, since the theory predicts that both indices matter. Third, we analyze how
our results change when we take different values of δ to compute linguistic distances.
Table 9, Panel B, reports the results. Our findings are largely unchanged, though
somewhat weaker for low values of δ.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have proposed a theory that analyzes the relation between diversity,
public goods and transfers. Following the existing literature, the theory assumes that
people are lesswilling to pay taxes in countrieswith high degrees of overall diversity. In
addition to this standard argument, we have advanced the hypothesis that in countries
that suffer from greater antagonism between the center and the periphery it is harder to
reach a political agreement on public goods than on transfers. To distinguish between
these two arguments, we have defined two types of diversity: a country’s overall
diversity which captures the tension between all individuals and affects the willingness
to pay taxes; and a country’s peripheral diversity which captures the tension between
the center and the periphery and affects the cost of providing public goods.
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Our simple theory has yielded four predictions: greater peripheral diversity lowers
public goods provision but increases transfers, whereas greater overall diversity has
no effect on public goods provision but lowers transfers. Our empirical analysis has
provided evidence in support of these theoretical predictions. An important conclu-
sion is that public goods and transfers are substitutes in their relation to a change in
peripheral diversity.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
To simplify the notation we drop 0 from the subscripts and write τ j instead of τ0 j .
(1) First consider the case τk = τl = τ . We have to show that s∗k ≥ s∗l . Suppose,
to the contrary, that s∗k < s∗l . Let s′ ∈ Skl(s) be such that s′j = s∗j for all j = k, j = l
and s′k = s′l = x ≡ s
∗
k +s∗l
2 . Since PA(s
′, T ) < PA(s∗, T ), it follows that
2 f pc(s0, x, τ ) + 2 fcp(s0, x, τ ) < f pc(s0, s∗k , τ ) + f pc(s0, s∗l , τ )
+ fcp(s0, s∗k , τ ) + fcp(s0, s∗l , τ ). (14)
By Condition 3, functions f pc(s0, ., τ ) and fcp(s0, ., τ ) are concave, which implies
f pc(s0, x, τ ) ≥ 1
2
f pc(s0, s
∗
k , τ ) +
1
2
f pc(s0, s
∗
l , τ ) (15)
and
fcp(s0, x, τ ) ≥ 1
2
fcp(s0, s
∗
k , τ ) +
1
2
fcp(s0, s
∗
l , τ ). (16)
It is straightforward to verify that inequalities (14)–(16) can not hold simultaneously.
Thus, we have that s∗k ≥ s∗l . Notice that τl = τk implies s∗l ≥ s∗k and s∗k ≥ s∗l so that
s∗k = s∗l .
(2) Now consider the case τk > τl . We shall show that s∗k ≥ s∗l . Suppose, in
negation, that s∗k < s∗l . Let T ′ ∈ T , be such that τ ′j = τ j for all j = l and τ ′l = τk .
Notice that τ ′j > τl . Similarly to the previous examination, let s′ ∈ Skl(s) be such that
s′j = s∗j for all j = k, j = l and s′k = s′l = x ≡ s
∗
k +s∗l
2 . We have
PA(s′, T ) < PA(s∗, T ). (17)
This implies that
f pc(s0, x, τk) + f pc(s0, x, τl) + fcp(s0, x, τk) + fcp(s0, x, τl) (18)
< f pc(s0, s
∗
k , τk) + f pc(s0, s∗l , τl) + fcp(s0, s∗k , τk) + fcp(s0, s∗l , τl),
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which is equivalent to
f pc(s0, x, τk) − f pc(s0, s∗k , τk) + fcp(s0, x, τk) − fcp(s0, s∗k , τk) (19)
< f pc(s0, s
∗
l , τl) − f pc(s0, x, τl) + fcp(s0, s∗l , τl) − fcp(s0, x, τl).
The argument used in case 1 above yields
PA(s′, T ′) > PA(s∗, T ′),
which implies that
f pc(s0, x, τk) + f pc(s0, x, τk) + fcp(s0, x, τk) + fcp(s0, x, τk) (20)
> f pc(s0, s
∗
k , τk) + f pc(s0, s∗l , τk) + fcp(s0, s∗k , τk) + fcp(s0, s∗l , τk).
By rearranging the terms we obtain
f pc(s0, x, τk) − f pc(s0, s∗k , τk) + fcp(s0, x, τk) − fcp(s0, s∗k , τk) (21)
> f pc(s0, s
∗
l , τk) − f pc(s0, x, τk) + fcp(s0, s∗l , τk) − fcp(s0, x, τk).
Inequalities (19) and (21) imply
f pc(s0, s
∗
l , τk) − f pc(s0, x, τk) + fcp(s0, s∗l , τk) − fcp(s0, x, τk) (22)
< f pc(s0, s
∗
l , τl) − f pc(s0, x, τl) + fcp(s0, s∗l , τl) − fcp(s0, x, τl).
Since s∗l > x and τk > τl , Condition 4 implies that
f pc(s0, s
∗
l , τk) − f pc(s0, x, τk) > f pc(s0, s∗l , τl) − f pc(s0, x, τl) and (23)
fcp(s0, s
∗
l , τk) − fcp(s0, x, τk) > fcp(s0, s∗l , τl) − fcp(s0, x, τl),
and (23) and (21) do not hold simultaneously. Hence we conclude that s∗k ≥ s∗l .
Appendix B: Data sources and diversity indices
Absolute latitudeThe absolute value of the latitude of a country’s approximate geodesic
centroid, as reported by the CIA World Factbook. Source: Ashraf and Galor (2013).
Child mortality Log of child mortality rate per 1000 live births, 1990–2010 average.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
GDP per capita GDP per capita, constant 2005 US$, 1990–2010 average. Source:
World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Illiteracy Percentage of people aged 15 and above who are illiterate, 1990–2010 aver-
age. Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Improved sanitation Percentage of populationwith access to improved sanitation facil-
ities, 1990–2010 average. Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
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Legal origin Socialist, French, German or British legal origin Source: La Porta et al.
(2008).
Language data Languages spoken in each country and language trees. Source: Eth-
nologue: Languages of the World, 15th Edition, SIL International, 2005.
Major religions Share of protestants, catholics and muslims in the population.
Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
Measles immunization Percentage of children between the age of 12 and 23 months
that have been immunized against measles, 1990–2010 average. Source: World Devel-
opment Indicators, World Bank.
Population. Total population, 1990–2010 average. Source: World Development Indi-
cators, World Bank.
Population above 65 Population ages 65 and above, % of total, 1990–2010 average.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
School attainment. Log of 1 + average years of schooling of population aged 25 or
above, 1990–2010 average. Source: Barro R. and J.W. Lee v. 1.3, 04/13.
Road density Road network density, km per 1000 inhabitants, 2001–2010 average.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Terrain roughness The degree of terrain roughness of a country, calculated using
geospatial surface undulation data reported by the G-ECON project (Nordhaus 2006)
at a 1-degree resolution. Source: Ashraf and Galor (2013).
Transfers Transfers and subsidies as percent of GDP: Average for 1990, 1995, 2000,
2005 and 2010. Source: Gwartney et al. (2012), Economic Freedom Dataset, Fraser
Institute.
Table 10 Indices of linguistic diversity: Greenberg’s B-index and peripheral diversity
Country Greenberg
B-index
Peripheral
diversity
Ranking
B-index
Ranking
peripheral
Difference
Afghanistan 0.5025 1.9543 46 56 −10
Albania 0.1746 0.6157 135 151 −16
Algeria 0.2266 0.8056 122 125 −3
American Samoa 0.0929 0.3736 165 165 0
Andorra 0.1951 0.5329 130 153 −23
Angola 0.2136 1.1049 126 100 26
Anguilla 0.1405 0.3488 150 170 −20
Antigua and Barbuda 0.0566 0.2570 179 184 −5
Argentina 0.1706 0.9401 137 113 24
Armenia 0.1513 0.6285 146 146 0
Aruba 0.3774 1.0115 76 106 −30
Australia 0.0972 1.1795 162 94 68
Austria 0.2430 0.8443 114 121 −7
Azerbaijan 0.3643 1.5682 82 73 9
Bahamas 0.3593 0.8462 84 120 −36
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Table 10 continued
Country Greenberg
B-index
Peripheral
diversity
Ranking
B-index
Ranking
peripheral
Difference
Bahrain 0.5457 1.7588 37 64 −27
Bangladesh 0.1525 0.7960 145 127 18
Barbados 0.0910 0.2653 167 182 −15
Belarus 0.2374 0.7477 119 133 −14
Belgium 0.4798 1.8378 54 61 −7
Belize 0.6723 1.9368 6 57 −51
Benin 0.4567 2.7947 59 27 32
Bermuda 0.0000 0.0000 219 219 0
Bhutan 0.6000 3.3685 22 18 4
Bolivia 0.6685 2.0788 7 51 −44
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
0.2467 0.7221 113 137 −24
Botswana 0.1528 1.0596 144 103 41
Brazil 0.0243 0.5203 199 155 44
British Indian Ocean
Terr.
0.0000 0.0000 220 220 0
British Virgin Islands 0.1671 0.3911 139 162 −23
Brunei 0.3734 1.5568 78 74 4
Bulgaria 0.2092 0.7409 127 134 −7
Burkina Faso 0.4364 2.3456 62 42 20
Burundi 0.0018 0.0353 215 214 1
Cambodia 0.1307 0.6963 155 142 13
Cameroon 0.4984 5.4310 48 7 41
Canada 0.4129 2.4837 72 36 36
Cape Verde Islands 0.0699 0.2260 171 188 −17
Cayman Islands 0.5350 1.2683 42 89 −47
Central African
Republic
0.5984 6.7938 23 3 20
Chad 0.8035 7.2055 1 2 −1
Chile 0.0326 0.2097 194 189 5
China 0.3379 2.7538 90 30 60
Colombia 0.0288 0.6969 195 141 54
Comoros 0.1101 0.3554 159 168 −9
Congo 0.6050 5.1178 20 8 12
Cook Islands 0.0912 0.3058 166 175 −9
Costa Rica 0.0495 0.3572 185 166 19
Cote dIvoire 0.5350 3.4780 41 17 24
Croatia 0.0621 0.2895 176 178 −2
Cuba 0.0002 0.0060 217 218 −1
Cyprus 0.3643 0.7762 81 131 −50
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Table 10 continued
Country Greenberg
B-index
Peripheral
diversity
Ranking
B-index
Ranking
peripheral
Difference
Czech Republic 0.0477 0.2860 188 179 9
DRC 0.5497 3.9324 35 12 23
Denmark 0.0368 0.3209 192 173 19
Djibouti 0.3766 0.9986 77 107 −30
Dominica 0.3116 0.6535 98 144 −46
Dominican Republic 0.0528 0.2924 182 177 5
East Timor 0.6572 2.0903 8 49 −41
Ecuador 0.2559 1.1454 111 97 14
Egypt 0.2286 0.8285 121 124 −3
El Salvador 0.0043 0.0588 211 210 1
Equatorial Guinea 0.1842 0.7376 131 135 −4
Eritrea 0.5009 1.7238 47 65 −18
Estonia 0.4676 1.3485 56 84 −28
Ethiopia 0.5678 3.3114 30 19 11
Falkland Islands 0.0000 0.0000 222 222 0
Fiji 0.5294 1.8712 44 60 −16
Finland 0.1323 0.6435 154 145 9
France 0.1841 1.3533 132 83 49
French Guiana 0.4271 1.6219 68 70 −2
French Polynesia 0.3984 0.9369 73 115 −42
Gabon 0.3043 1.3563 100 82 18
Gambia 0.4917 1.7987 52 63 −11
Georgia 0.5386 2.2305 39 44 −5
Germany 0.1326 1.0805 152 102 50
Ghana 0.3687 2.2301 79 45 34
Gibraltar 0.4979 1.0252 49 104 −55
Greece 0.1297 0.7962 156 126 30
Greenland 0.2419 0.5056 116 156 −40
Grenada 0.0519 0.2334 183 185 −2
Guadeloupe 0.0653 0.2852 175 180 −5
Guam 0.5666 1.3898 31 81 −50
Guatemala 0.6101 3.9733 18 11 7
Guinea 0.4802 2.0787 53 52 1
Guinea-Bissau 0.5659 1.9105 32 58 −26
Guyana 0.0778 0.5553 169 152 17
Haiti 0.0002 0.0094 218 217 1
Honduras 0.0528 0.3528 181 169 12
Hungary 0.1564 0.8722 141 119 22
Iceland 0.0106 0.0597 206 209 −3
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Table 10 continued
Country Greenberg
B-index
Peripheral
diversity
Ranking
B-index
Ranking
peripheral
Difference
India 0.6788 5.5610 5 6 −1
Indonesia 0.5504 6.0363 34 5 29
Iran 0.6390 3.7850 12 15 −3
Iraq 0.4612 1.6765 57 68 −11
Ireland 0.1510 0.4314 147 159 −12
Israel 0.5316 2.7665 43 29 14
Italy 0.2775 1.2882 105 87 18
Jamaica 0.0111 0.1307 205 200 5
Japan 0.0240 0.2035 200 190 10
Jordan 0.2203 0.7958 124 128 −4
Kazakhstan 0.6297 2.5050 16 35 −19
Kenya 0.5790 2.8531 28 25 3
Kiribati 0.0225 0.1361 201 199 2
Korea, North 0.0000 0.0000 223 223 0
Korea, South 0.0030 0.0404 212 211 1
Kuwait 0.2425 0.6266 115 147 −32
Kyrgyzstan 0.5923 2.1173 25 48 −23
Laos 0.5470 3.8126 36 14 22
Latvia 0.4290 1.3445 67 85 −18
Lebanon 0.1532 0.6160 143 150 −7
Lesotho 0.0584 0.1622 178 196 −18
Liberia 0.6031 3.0010 21 23 −2
Libya 0.1809 0.6260 133 148 −15
Liechtenstein 0.0658 0.2274 174 187 −13
Lithuania 0.2491 0.7916 112 129 −17
Luxembourg 0.3494 0.9708 88 108 −20
Macedonia 0.4608 1.1860 58 93 −35
Madagascar 0.2868 1.0950 103 101 2
Malawi 0.1703 0.7008 138 140 −2
Malaysia 0.6476 3.5729 11 16 −5
Maldives 0.0047 0.0363 210 213 −3
Mali 0.6354 3.2920 14 21 −7
Malta 0.0157 0.0970 203 206 −3
Marshall Islands 0.0266 0.1295 196 201 −5
Martinique 0.0427 0.1944 190 191 −1
Mauritania 0.1713 0.6564 136 143 −7
Mauritius 0.6080 2.0883 19 50 −31
Mayotte 0.4372 0.9453 61 111 −50
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Table 10 continued
Country Greenberg
B-index
Peripheral
diversity
Ranking
B-index
Ranking
peripheral
Difference
India 0.6788 5.5610 5 6 −1
Indonesia 0.5504 6.0363 34 5 29
Iran 0.6390 3.7850 12 15 −3
Iraq 0.4612 1.6765 57 68 −11
Ireland 0.1510 0.4314 147 159 −12
Israel 0.5316 2.7665 43 29 14
Italy 0.2775 1.2882 105 87 18
Jamaica 0.0111 0.1307 205 200 5
Japan 0.0240 0.2035 200 190 10
Jordan 0.2203 0.7958 124 128 −4
Kazakhstan 0.6297 2.5050 16 35 −19
Kenya 0.5790 2.8531 28 25 3
Kiribati 0.0225 0.1361 201 199 2
Korea, North 0.0000 0.0000 223 223 0
Korea, South 0.0030 0.0404 212 211 1
Kuwait 0.2425 0.6266 115 147 −32
Kyrgyzstan 0.5923 2.1173 25 48 −23
Laos 0.5470 3.8126 36 14 22
Latvia 0.4290 1.3445 67 85 −18
Lebanon 0.1532 0.6160 143 150 −7
Lesotho 0.0584 0.1622 178 196 −18
Liberia 0.6031 3.0010 21 23 −2
Libya 0.1809 0.6260 133 148 −15
Liechtenstein 0.0658 0.2274 174 187 −13
Palau 0.0491 0.1741 186 195 −9
West Bank and Gaza 0.1012 0.2787 160 181 −21
Panama 0.3233 1.1163 94 98 −4
Papua New Guinea 0.7966 16.1864 2 1 1
Paraguay 0.3352 1.4742 91 78 13
Peru 0.3664 2.5423 80 34 46
Philippines 0.4720 3.3111 55 20 35
Pitcairn 0.0000 0.0000 226 226 0
Poland 0.0388 0.3195 191 174 17
Portugal 0.0137 0.1371 204 198 6
Puerto Rico 0.0356 0.1851 193 193 0
Qatar 0.5825 1.5415 27 75 −48
Reunion 0.0660 0.3412 173 172 1
Romania 0.1574 0.7065 140 139 1
Russia 0.2411 2.4452 117 38 79
Rwanda 0.0017 0.0373 216 212 4
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Country Greenberg
B-index
Peripheral
diversity
Ranking
B-index
Ranking
peripheral
Difference
St Helena 0.0000 0.0000 221 221 0
St Kitts and Nevis 0.0102 0.0765 207 208 −1
St Lucia 0.0198 0.1100 202 205 −3
St Pierre and
Miquelon
0.1172 0.3873 157 163 −6
St Vincent and the
Grenadines
0.0086 0.0960 209 207 2
Samoa 0.0020 0.0327 214 215 −1
San Marino 0.2390 0.4834 118 157 −39
Sao Tome e Principe 0.3575 0.9220 85 117 −32
Saudi Arabia 0.3554 1.3938 86 80 6
Senegal 0.4169 1.8800 70 59 11
Serbia and
Montenegro
0.2850 0.9635 104 110 −6
Seychelles 0.0666 0.2934 172 176 −4
Sierra Leone 0.5875 2.1721 26 47 −21
Singapore 0.6538 2.4520 9 37 −28
Slovakia 0.2674 0.8299 107 123 −16
Slovenia 0.0929 0.4002 164 161 3
Solomon Islands 0.4970 2.8387 50 26 24
Somalia 0.0944 0.4519 163 158 5
South Africa 0.4952 1.6125 51 71 −20
Spain 0.1547 0.5279 142 154 −12
Sri Lanka 0.3109 0.7219 99 138 −39
Sudan 0.5414 4.8948 38 9 29
Suriname 0.7207 2.3556 3 39 −36
Swaziland 0.0439 0.1175 189 204 −15
Sweden 0.1345 0.9342 151 116 35
Switzerland 0.3870 1.4799 75 77 −2
Syria 0.3221 1.1149 95 99 −4
Taiwan 0.3215 1.0187 96 105 −9
Tajikistan 0.4355 1.6329 63 69 −6
Tanzania 0.3425 2.7305 89 31 58
Thailand 0.4153 2.0042 71 54 17
Togo 0.4312 2.3459 65 41 24
Tokelau 0.0538 0.1937 180 192 −12
Tonga 0.0028 0.0225 213 216 −3
Trinidad and Tobago 0.5972 1.6849 24 67 −43
Tunisia 0.0095 0.1397 208 197 11
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Country Greenberg
B-index
Peripheral
diversity
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B-index
Ranking
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Difference
Turkey 0.2729 1.4994 106 76 30
Turkmenistan 0.3186 1.4721 97 79 18
Turks and Caicos
Islands
0.1455 0.3568 149 167 −18
Tuvalu 0.0512 0.1276 184 202 −18
U.S. Virgin Islands 0.3329 0.8390 93 122 −29
Uganda 0.5742 2.8565 29 24 5
Ukraine 0.2968 1.2675 101 90 11
United Arab Emirates 0.6971 2.6813 4 32 −28
United Kingdom 0.1104 1.2293 158 91 67
Uruguay 0.0480 0.2640 187 183 4
USA 0.2631 2.2270 109 46 63
Uzbekistan 0.3616 1.7139 83 66 17
Vanuatu 0.4215 2.5879 69 33 36
Vatican State 0.0000 0.0000 224 224 0
Venezuela 0.0253 0.4011 198 160 38
Viet Nam 0.2023 1.8319 129 62 67
Wallis and Futuna 0.0589 0.1815 177 194 −17
Yemen 0.2907 0.8854 102 118 −16
Zambia 0.2254 1.1548 123 96 27
Zimbabwe 0.1501 0.6180 148 149 −1
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